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DISCUSSION
Political culture and its types in the post-Yugoslav Area1
Ladislav Cabada
Abstract: The aim of the article is to apply the concept of traditional, modern, 
and obmodern society on the development of political culture in the post-Yugoslav 
area. The post-Yugoslav – and generally post-Communist – societies might be ana-
lysed as interesting example of limited modernisation after the 1945, when some 
spheres were developed similarly in the comparison with the Westerns societies, 
but in other the development was stopped, retarded or deformed. Next to the tra-
ditional dichotomy traditional vs. modern society we apply the interesting model 
of obmodern society presented by the Slovenian sociologist Ivan Bernik. Based on 
the analysis we generally construct the “geocultural” dividing line between two 
groups of political culture in the post-Yugoslav area.
Keywords: post-Yugoslav area; political culture; traditional society; modern 
society; obmodern society; geocultural division
Introduction
The question of the Balkans as a speciﬁ c geographical, political and cultural for-
mation reappeared in social science after 1990 in connection with the outbreak of 
several war conﬂ icts on the territory of the former Socialist Federative Republic 
of Yugoslavia. During the Cold War period, the term “Balkan” had again become 
a mere geographical term2; however, after 1990 the Western world returned to 
a “well-tried” cultural and political deﬁ nition of the Balkans as a “homogeneous” 
complex. This complex had existed practically since the 16th century, when the 
majority of Balkans territory was ruled over by the Ottoman Empire, understood 
as a European periphery, an “anarchistic and barbarian periphery, from which the 
West dissociates” (Hösch 1998: 603). As Maria Todorova successfully showed, in 
this case we have to deal with “indolent assumption”, based especially on stere-
otypes and preconceptions (Todorova 1999). Be that as it may, we cannot ignore 
1 This article is a research outcome of institutional support of speciﬁ c research (instuticonální pod-
pora speciﬁ ckého výzkumu) project at Dept. of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of 
Philosophy, University of West Bohemia in Pilsen.
2 In the period of bipolar separation of the world and also because of the speciﬁ c position of Tito’s 
Yugoslavia the southeastern European peninsula was divided into three parts: Soviet, Yugoslav 
and “Western” (Waisová 2002: 57).
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the fact that the Balkans as a region has demonstrated and continues to demonstrate 
many speciﬁ c characteristics, which make it a sui generis case.
In this article I shall try to (re)deﬁ ne the basic deﬁ nitions of so-called Balkan politi-
cal culture. I will focus especially on the evolution in the western part of the Balkan 
Peninsula – that is, on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This is a speciﬁ c area, 
which was for long periods a part of mutual state units (Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia). 
But we may clearly observe that even this long common evolution does not induce 
similar evolution of the political cultures of individual national-cultural-religious en-
tities. My interpretation will be based above all on some theoretical works which fo-
cus on the differences between traditional and modern society, and I shall apply these 
theories to our concrete knowledge about the evolution in the former Yugoslavia.
Historical development of the Balkans – traditional or modern society
The concept of dividing human societies into traditional and modern arose in the 
modern social sciences in the latter half of the 19th century. In this sense, Emile Du-
rkheim’s About the societal division of work, which appeared in 1893, may be con-
sidered the seminal work. The author distinguished two types of societies with a dif-
ferent type of solidarity – organic and mechanic. “The organic solidarity of modern 
society is conditioned with the division of work among specialised subgroups; me-
chanic solidarity of the traditional non-stratiﬁ ed society is maintained by all members 
of partial relational mutually homogenous segments” (Budil 2001: 404). We have to 
deal with a classiﬁ cation in which the main criterion is the functional specialisation of 
an individual that makes him an independently acting individuality. If this criterion is 
not fulﬁ lled, we can talk about the observed society as a traditional one.
Examples of modern European societies are undoubtedly the so-called western 
societies, which underwent a speciﬁ c historical development from the beginning of 
the 19th century.3 The result of this development is a modern, secularised society 
with a high level of individual independence. On the principle of dichotomy and 
mutual struggle certain cultural and intellectual phenomena (for example renais-
sance/reformation, classicism/enlightenment, realism/positivism etc) dynamic 
energy was created and released. The ﬁ nal consequence of this process was open-
ness and plurality. The eastern part of the European continent practically did not 
participate in this process of development (Hösch 1998: 605).
In a Europe with such development, an imaginary dividing line was created 
between West and East, in other words between modern and traditional society4. 
3 As the break point we can regard the year 1492 (Cabada 2000). 
4 The German thinker Walter Schamschula states that eastward from this lane there are living Rus-
sians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins. 
80
Political culture and its types in the post-Yugoslav Area Ladislav Cabada
It is worth noting that all the societies behind this line display a dominance 
of orthodox religious denomination, while for example Slovenian and Croatian 
society with a dominance of popery is afﬁ liated to the West. In my opinion, 
this – purely bipolar – segmentation is too simplistic and imprecise. Undoubt-
edly, under Ottoman dominance the Balkan region developed differently in com-
parison with other European regions. This difference led to the establishment of 
speciﬁ c societal and political preconditions, which inﬂ uenced the development 
of the political culture of individual ethnical and national communities. This 
speciﬁ city was based especially on the crossbreeding of different impacts – 
“one quarter Attic, one quarter Turkish, one quarter New Greek, and one quarter 
Bavarian”, said Duke Hermann von Pichler about Athens in the 17th century 
(Hösch 1998: 616). Indeed, we cannot identify with the ethnocentric view of the 
Balkans as a territory where “Turkish dominance caused permanent retardation” 
(Hösch 1998: 611).
Wars in the Balkans – primarily the Austrian-Ottoman rivalry – contributed 
above all to the ethnical immaturity of the entire Balkans region. This immaturity 
led to extensive cultural contacts, but it did not induce sharp mixing of cultures. 
The primary reason was to be found in the geographical preconditions of the 
internal Balkans where hilly areas dominated, thus limiting operational possi-
bilities. This precondition, together with the inﬂ uence of component religious 
denominations, led to the creation of localised society. As Igor Lukšič mentioned, 
the borders of the community lie at the border of the village. “Moral, political 
and cultural borders were delineated by the village community. The awareness of 
authentic, real people with authentic interests and obligations to the community 
was exercised. Without a state and market system and with totalitarian power 
of the church it was not possible to develop the space of abstraction of modern 
(liberal) politics with an abstract citizen – that is, with legal equality and freedom 
of the individual” (Lukšič 2001: 64).
We may observe that the main difference between the West and the Balkans in 
the ﬁ eld of political culture5 is based on the status and rights of the individual as a 
member of the political community and/or in the largeness and internal structure of 
this community. While in the West the rights of the individual as a member of soci-
ety and the political system are continuously being purveyed and deepened, Balkan 
political culture is based on localism, characterised by membership of the indi-
vidual in the local (rural) community – this being the primary membership which 
determines the majority of the political attitudes of the individual. In this sense, the 
role of the most important authority is played by the local political leader, who is 
5 Naturally, if we accept the idea that this comparison is acceptable for our study.
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mostly identiﬁ ed with the local religious exponent. K. Zernack speaks in this con-
text about the afﬁ nity of Byzantine and Turkish competence (Zernack 1977: 46).
The individual community develops very independently, distinctly isolated from 
other local communities. This is one of the reasons why for long centuries we can 
observe in the traditional communities in the Balkans a lack of institutions. Mis-
cellaneous communities with different cultural patterns were living often on very 
small territory; their political culture based on a reluctance to communicate with 
neighbouring communities and on sharp self-sufﬁ ciency. When we introduce to 
these “rural communities” (Dorfgemeinschaft) the power approach, we might an-
ticipate tragedy (Hösch 1998: 620). 
Another important attribute, which is connected with the detachedness of local 
communities in the central regions of the Balkans, is the inability to view political 
matters in an abstract sense. The individual is not able to refer to central institu-
tions, his life is enacted within the clearly deﬁ ned borders of the community. All 
relations are based on strictly patrilinear grounds; here the basis is mostly – in the 
opinion of the Austrian historian Karl Kaser – the time-honoured concept of the 
whole family (zadruga) (Höschl 1998: 621). 
Considering all the presented arguments we may note that on the Balkan peninsu-
la, above all in its hilly area (Dinar mountainous regions), in the period of 16th-19th 
century, speciﬁ c communities were created with a speciﬁ c political culture. These 
communities could be deﬁ ned as traditional in the sense of the dichotomy modern 
vs. traditional society. Speciﬁ c political culture, based on the local communities and 
unclear identiﬁ cation with the political centre, is not in itself a source of conﬂ ict. 
This dimension was brought into the political cultures of the central Balkan regions 
from outside, above all with the wave of nationalism in the 19th century, which is 
closely connected also with the role of the religious denominations. Particularly 
important here is the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church and its crystallised Mes-
sianism, though other denominations also were creating a strong misalliance with 
nationalism. For example the role of the Catholic Church in Slovenian and Croat 
society was, up to the Second World War, markedly higher and “speciﬁ c” in com-
parison with the West European countries. 
A further important factor is that destabilisation and conﬂ ict were reintroduced 
into Balkan political culture with the process of modernisation. The modernisation 
supporters – national intelligence in the process of creation – were without doubt 
supporters of nationalistic ideas, which, similarly as in the western part of Europe, 
were based on the idea of exclusivity. The national political elite strove for insti-
tutionalisation of Balkan communities on national and religious grounds, but the 
new ideas were not understandable for the local communities. Local communities 
were not able to participate in the modernisation process, especially because of 
82
Political culture and its types in the post-Yugoslav Area Ladislav Cabada
their inability of political abstraction. The consequence of this discrepancy was 
a deepening of the gap between the political elite and the “rest” of society. Local 
communities became only passive observers who understood the changes only on 
a symbolic level (a similar model can also be seen in some post-Yugoslav societies 
in the 1990s).
Political modernisation in the Balkans is connected with the intellectual elite (but 
not with the development of market and industrialisation), which were established 
beyond the reach of the local communities. A strong dichotomy between the city 
and the country6 was established where the city was understood as something dirty, 
depraved, and strange, as something which was disturbing the traditional processes. 
As early as 1902 this discrepancy between the old, traditional world and the new, 
“modern” epoch was described in At the hill (Na klancu) by the famous Slovenian 
writer Ivan Cankar. Symptomatically, the author lived in a relatively developed and 
“modernised” part of the Balkans (Cankar 1995). 
When we observe the historical development in the Balkans in the 19th century, 
we can see that the modernisation supporters (intellectuals) strove for modernisa-
tion above all in political life – an effort to create a national state – while they 
downgraded and/or prevented modernisation in the economic, social and cultural 
spheres. An important and symptomatic attribute is the unwillingness to transfer 
modern political rights to the national communities thus created. There is no eman-
cipation of the individual as a political subject, having the possibility to participate 
in the political process. On the contrary, those who could take part in this process 
were above all the traditional representatives of local communities.
Developments in the ﬁ rst Yugoslavia (1918-1941) also correspond to this inter-
pretation of political modernisation. The political order of this state may be de-
scribed as very conservative, let us say traditional. Evidence of this may be seen 
for example in the development of an electoral law which did not correspond to 
developments in Western Europe, nor even in Central Europe. The active election 
right was restricted only to men older than 21 years (passive right was a minimum 
of 30 years); also the educational census was applied – knowledge of the “national” 
language (Cabada 2000b: 117). If in the 1920s the new state tried to incorporate 
at least formal liberalisation – and modernisation – of political life, after the proc-
lamation of dictatorship in 1929 the Belgrade leadership gave up on this mission. 
Moreover, in the unsatisﬁ ed traditional communities, which did not possess any in-
ﬂ uence on the political scene, the traditional representatives – especially churches – 
started to play the role of warriors against the “centre”. The result was authoritarian, 
6 The rural population in the Balkans was substantially more numerous than the urban population. 
In 1841, 83% of the population in the Balkans worked in agriculture, while in the United Kingdom 
this ﬁ gure was only 22%. 
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fascist political regimes in Slovenia and Croatia in the ﬁ rst half of the 1940s with 
a strong inﬂ uence of the Catholic Church, but also the monarchist (četnik) move-
ment in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. When we look closely at the internal 
segmentation of these political elements, we can see that they gained their support 
above all in the traditional political structure. For example, the Slovenian Territorial 
Army, which collaborated with the Italians and later Germans, was based on the 
principle of the so-called countriﬁ ed guard. Their main opponents were partisans, 
mainly communists, bringing political, social and economic modernisation. They 
offered a programme of participation of the individual in political and economic 
life, although it was shown that many arrangements were only temporary and many 
promises were not realised. 
Tito’s Yugoslavia and its demise
In my opinion, there is no reason to doubt the modernity of the political pro-
gramme of the Yugoslav partisan movement only because of the predominance 
of communists. Comparing the measures introduced by the partisans led by Tito 
with the situation before 1941, we can see important changes in the functioning of 
society. Introduction of a broadminded election law7, an effort for quick economic 
modernisation (above all industrialisation), involvement of a modern concept of 
multiethnic coexistence and development towards a consensual model of state 
functioning were basic characteristics of the political system, especially after the 
quarrel with the Soviet Union. Of course, the above-mentioned principles were only 
theoretical, even if they became part of the constitution. On a practical level, up to 
1953 the Yugoslav model functioned similarly to the models in the Soviet camp; at 
the beginning Yugoslavia was even Stalin’s most painstaking scholar. Later, after 
redeﬁ ning the basic principles of “democratic centralism”, important changes were 
brought into the system, but they mostly remained only formal. 
A speciﬁ c role was played by the constitutional changes conducted by Tito’s top 
ideologist Edvard Kardelj. After the quarrel with the Soviet Union, Kardelj started 
to combine Marxist theory with radical anarchism. The cornerstone of his theory 
was communes, independent municipal units, which in the future were to take up 
the role of the “dying” state. The communes were in fact small territorial units, 
which alongside municipal functions also took up a part of state functions. Un-
doubtedly, we may observe here certain continuity with the local communities from 
the “pre-communist” epoch. In the communes almost the whole economic, social 
and political life of the individual was realised – the rate of individual emancipation 
7 Active and passive election rights for every institution were from the age of 18. In the event that 
the individual started to ﬁ ght (in time of war) or work before he was 18, he gained the election 
rights for at least some institutions. 
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was only as high as the internal conditions in the “traditional” communes were 
changed. Political modernisation then in many cases only seemed to be moderni-
sation and in the communes (especially the rural) there still ruled the traditional 
models of linkages, responsibility and decision mechanisms. The modernisation 
supporter became the city, where a section of the rural population was moving. In 
a strange environment their main guideline was the ruling ideology and its institu-
tional grounds – the communist organisation with the Union of Communists on the 
top. Although this organisation was centralised, it still allowed for a more clearly 
deﬁ ned political emancipation of the individual in comparison with the traditional 
rural communities. Yugoslav literature contains descriptions of precisely this “mod-
ernisation metamorphosis of the individual” in the process of transition from the 
rural to the urban environment.8
In contrast to western countries, the modernisation jump in Yugoslavia – simi-
larly as in other socialist states –was realised during the 1950s and 1960s. Firstly 
this jump is shown in the political sphere (emancipation of the individual), later in 
the economic sphere (industrialisation) and in the 1960s we can then observe the 
ﬁ rst changes also in the cultural sphere. And precisely at this moment there are 
also emerging initial doubts about the success of modernisation. It was shown that 
after the ﬁ rst modernisation jump, the system began with the construction of rigid 
institutional structures, which limited and deformed subsequent modernisation 
processes (Adam 1989: 22). The consequence of this deformation was a stopping 
of the modernisation process, to which some sectors responded with an effort for 
more independent politics. In fact, active sectors were those with a signﬁ cant share 
of the urban population, where new, “modernised” societal formations were being 
created. These formations strove for another form of modernisation and to bring 
Yugoslavia closer to the western societal and political model. The immediate reac-
tion of the political system was suppression of the new formations (Balut, Cabada 
2000: 752). 
The pressure by some sections of society for the continuation of political and 
cultural modernisation was averted by the system with the constitutional reform 
in 1974. Edvard Kardelj again inspired the changes. The new constitution was to 
be another step on the road to abolishing the state. Elections were cancelled and 
substituted by a complicated system of delegations; the role of republic, national 
segments also increased. This led to a provisional reduction of the pressure that was 
coming above all from Slovenia and Croatia.
The next crisis for the system came sooner than expected – in the 1980s. One rea-
son was the death of the charismatic leader Tito and the ensuing battle for supremacy 
8 As an example we could name the – in many ways very controversial – book Knife (Nož) by Vuk 
Drašković (Drašković 1995).
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among the communist leaders; another reason was the economic situation. The cri-
sis showed that deformation of the modernisation process in the political sphere 
could strongly inﬂ uence the personal economic satisfaction of the individual. The 
masses, who were still depoliticised and whose interest in the functioning of the 
system was above all economic, ceased to identify with the system. The reaction in 
the national communities was dual: one part wished to continue with modernisation 
and bringing Yugoslavia to the western model of society; the second group reverted 
to traditional values. These persistent values had lain hidden for decades, only to be 
reactivated in the 1980s (Adam 1989: 20).
The disintegration of Yugoslavia may also be interpreted as a conﬂ ict of two 
sharply differing political cultures, which were formed above all during the 1980s. 
On one side there was the “heading towards modernity” political culture of nation-
al segments, which accepted the majority of modernisation processes (Slovenia, 
Croatia). On the other side there was a political culture rooted in traditional models 
of political and societal behaviour with a strong role of the local community and 
local political elite. These two streams aspired to gain dominance in the common 
state and to unify political culture as the basis of post-Tito Yugoslavia. 
Since the mid-1980s the trend of establishing basic starting-points for aspects of 
both mentioned political cultures has sharply accelerated. The north-western part 
of Yugoslavia is rapidly coming to form the basic structures of a civic society. In 
the dichotomy traditional vs. modern society this means the creation of specialised 
political and societal structures and functional differentiation. Relatively structured 
party systems are created, as also are many non-formal associations which have 
arisen from the strengthening civic society – feministic, paciﬁ stic, ecological etc. 
(Cabada 2001: 202). All these events are a sign of the next wave of emancipation of 
the individual as a political subject who is struggling for his share in the decision-
making process.
On the other hand, in the southern parts of Yugoslavia in the latter half of the 
1980s there was a gradual interconnection of the political culture of traditional 
societies with the leadership principles. Here the starting point is the mythisation of 
Serbian history and reference to the old, practically tribal, form of state existence. 
The political rhetoric misguidedly employs terms associated with the nationalism 
of the 19th century. The traditional way of thinking is shown above all in the effort 
of the new political elite to win the support of the rural communities, while the 
urban units are mostly in opposition. This opposition may be seen especially in 
internal matters of society and changes in the political system; it is less manifest in 
foreign policy. Another important traditional characteristic is the role of the Serb 
Orthodox Church as the holder of traditional models of political culture (messian-
ism, self-sacriﬁ ce).
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Naturally we cannot claim that the dichotomy indicated here is pure. The Yu-
goslav modernisation process led to deformations (though less than in the Soviet 
satellites or even Soviet Union itself) and we may observe here two types of dis-
tinctly old-fashioned, non-modern structures: on the one hand those which were 
generated by the system (the majority of communist structures); then, on the other 
hand, latent traditional structures which were activated in the 1980s. It was impos-
sible to nullify the post-war modernisation process which had become one of the 
bases for the future development of Yugoslav societies. The only difference was the 
rate of acceptance of this process as the basis for future development. Societies in 
the northern part of Yugoslavia understood modernisation as being unfulﬁ lled and 
wished to correct this problem (the question of decentralisation of economic and 
political structures and higher emancipation of individual national sectors). Socie-
ties in the southern part of Yugoslavia considered modernisation as sufﬁ cient or 
even too extensive and disturbing the concept of a uniﬁ ed and centralised Yugoslav 
state formation. If there was some concordance between both approaches, it was 
without doubt the nationalistic approach. Nationalism provided a basis on which to 
build the Serbian projection of a centralised Yugoslavia as a “Great Serbian” area. 
It was also a basis for Slovenian and Croat politics, which understood Slovenes and 
Croats as exclusive entities with completely different qualities – political culture – 
as the other Yugoslav nations. 
It is evident that in Yugoslavia in the 1980s at the latest, there again loomed latent 
existing autonomous political cultures, which for the most part could identify with 
national segments.9 Especially in the northern parts of Yugoslavia there was hectic 
activity, whose aim was to demonstrate absolute dissimilarity of local political cul-
tures in comparison with Balkan (Serbian) political culture. The idea of Central Eu-
rope has also been reactivated, including Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina (Cabada 
2001: 204). Likewise religiously determined positions are revitalised, with some 
authors contrasting the “cultural” popery and “lesser cultural” Orthodox Church 
(Jambrek 1988: 154). Cultural stereotypes are resuscitated; again the “picture of the 
other” is important as a speciﬁ c part of individual self-identiﬁ cation. Again we can 
come across expressions which were rejected in the period of the ﬁ rst modernisa-
tion jump – “perﬁ dious Jesuits” (Croats), “Byzantine intriguers” (Serbs), “tricky 
Orientals” (Muslims) (Djilas 1994: 20) or “Southerns” (non-Slovenes) (Cabada 
2000a: 249).10 It is clear that the modernisation effort of Tito’s leadership to create 
a uniﬁ ed political Yugoslav nation has not succeeded. 
9 It is difﬁ cult to talk about a uniﬁ ed Croat national culture when comparing for example Dalmatia 
and Slavonia. 
10 The “picture of the other” in Balkans political culture is described in Mariana Lenkova’s book 
“Hate Speech” in the Balkans.
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In my opinion, different political cultures are one of the basic preconditions and 
reasons for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Some “post-Yugoslav” authors sup-
pose that behind the disintegration we have to look above all to the ambitions of 
political leaders. For the communist leaders, nationalism and war were the only 
chance to save their positions. I agree with this opinion, but in every successive 
state the (old)-new political elite was formed on the basis of concrete political cul-
ture, which was the basis for their political activities. 
Obmodern societies – relativisation of the dichotomy modern 
vs. traditional society
Hand in hand with the disintegration of the socialist block in the social sciences, 
research into the internal structure of individual societies has also changed sig-
niﬁ cantly. It has been demonstrated that rejection of the socialist societal model 
and the formation of different types of post-communist societal models can be ac-
commodated on a modern vs. traditional line only with great difﬁ culty. This linear 
conﬁ guration is too simplistic and unable to perceive the characteristics of post-
socialist societies. These societies have undergone a speciﬁ c modernisation proc-
ess that does not correspond absolutely to the models familiar in Western Europe 
where modernisation was realised primarily on the basis of economic and market 
development. Together with this, there was the pressure of society for extending 
political rights and greater functional differentiation of the political process. The 
main speciﬁ c feature of the modernisation process in the socialist camp was the 
effort to initiate modernisation from the top, with the dictate of the modernistic 
intellectually political elite. This combination of modernisation and socialism cre-
ated a speciﬁ c type of societies, which we – in the opinion of important Slovenian 
social scientist Ivan Bernik – could class as obmodern societies, which are for him 
a historically unique entity (Bernik 1997).
In these obmodern societies the modernisation process was deformed in com-
parison with the development in Western Europe. As a result, these societies are 
modernised only partly in some domains, while in others they have remained 
monodimensional, traditional (Bernik 1997: 25). The main domain where mod-
ernisation is lagging behind, is – not only for Bernik – the political sphere. In 
socialist societies the political system plays an over-dimensioned role, it is trying 
to interfere in all other spheres. If the political system is not able to hold the same 
tempo of modernisation as in the economic or social sphere, the result is deforma-
tion of the modernisation process and the establishment of a modernity deﬁ cit. 
This deﬁ cit is viewed by the modernisation – above all intellectual – elite as a 
shortcoming, which must be eliminated as soon as possible. The result is conﬂ ict 
between this elite and the political system; if the system feels strong enough, it 
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reacts with repression. If such repression could disrupt the stability of the politi-
cal system, there will be some partial modiﬁ cation – reform – which means an 
extension of the modernisation jump.
Such development leads to a situation in which individual socialist societies need 
not necessarily be internally similar. Thus it is impossible to set these societies on 
the continuum modern vs. traditional society. In other words, Bernik is claiming 
that, just as there is not only one type of modern society, we cannot speak only about 
one type of obmodern (post-socialist) society. Therefore he suggests setting the in-
dividual models into a spacial framework rather than on a line. This could stress the 
multidimensionality of the societies under examination (Bernik 1997: 24). 
Similar ideas to those expressed by Bernik may also be observed in the work of 
the Polish social scientist Jadwiga Staniszkis. She too deﬁ nes the modernisation 
of socialist societies as modernisation from the top. In her opinion, in the process 
of modernisation the rationality of the political elite and the “rest” of society was 
deepened. While the elite thinks in terms of lodging institutions, the masses as 
passive observers (some authors speak directly about the depolitisation of masses 
– Vajdová 1996: 345) see the development primarily in the prism of the standard of 
living and symbols (Staniszkis 2001: 62-63). 
In obmodern societies modernisation is coming from the top, it is not continuous 
and consistent and it is oriented to the deformations, but above all to the separation 
of the societies into distinctly different sectors, which could only communicate 
with difﬁ culty.11  
The different power of individual sectors could be one of the points for orien-
tation in the classiﬁ cation of the post-socialist systems. If the traditional sector 
ruled over the society (in possible combination with the communist sector), a new 
political system developed in the magic circle of deformed political modernisa-
tion. From the point of view of establishing a democratic form of governance, such 
systems offer few prospects. On the other hand, if the liberal sector prevailed in the 
society (again in possible combination with the sector established in the communist 
period), after the fall of socialism the next modernisation jump was started, which 
could mean the stabilisation of a democratic model of organisation.
11 For example Zdenka Vajdová in her analysis of the theoretical concepts and research of politi-
cal culture shows Schöpﬂ ins’ model of three communities inside post-communist societies: 1. 
Traditional (rural) society, whose values survived the communist modernisation. The society is 
open to populist demagogy, with a low degree of political literacy, non-understandable state and 
inferiority to etatism; 2. Society established even in the communist period, whose main character-
istic is a positive attitude to dependence on the state. A modernistic communist elite accepted the 
deformed view of modernisation as advantageous. The higher class changed its political power 
into economic power or converted towards nationalism as a means for preserving political power; 
3. Civic segment, liberal society strive for real modernisation and elimination of deformation in 
the modernisation process (Vajdová 1996: 345-346). 
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Also in the ﬁ eld of modernisation and change of political culture, the obmod-
ern societies show certain speciﬁ city. The main characteristic of innovations in 
the sphere of political culture is their limitation to small groups of the population, 
above all to the urban political-economic-educational elite. Precisely this new elite 
created new values of political orientation and infringed the cultural hegemony of 
the socialist system (Bernik 2000: 12) and became a bearer of change at the turn 
of the 1980s and 1990s. The political culture of the new elite in comparison with 
the political culture of the traditional sector – in spite of all modern deformations 
– came into conﬂ ict with the dominant political culture, whose supporters were 
mainly politicians and intellectuals relying on the traditional (rural) segment. One 
who repeatedly proved himself to be such a politician was S. Milošević – a member 
of the “modern” communist segment – searching for his political recourse in myth 
and tradition, based then in the rural regions in southern Yugoslavia. Milošević 
could also use the modernisation deformations, which strongly inﬂ uenced the spe-
ciﬁ c character of the Yugoslav political system, the structure of Yugoslav society 
and above all the political culture. This speciﬁ c character was designated especially 
with the fusion of egalitarian and authoritarian values and expectations. Political 
culture in Yugoslavia “namely had its roots in the tradition, but functionally it was 
implanted into the socialist society. The socialist system acquired the mass support 
(incomparable with the support in other socialist countries – L.C.) with fulﬁ lling 
the egalitarian expectations of the majority of population. Although the fusion of 
egalitarianism and authoritarianism functioned from the point of view of stability 
of the political system, it was at the same time quite non-functional in terms of the 
modernisation of Yugoslav society” (Bernik 1997: 86).   
In this sense, it is possible to understand Milošević’s behaviour after 1987. He 
was trying to satisfy the needs of the majority of the population, which for him was 
represented by Serbs.  He was winning support above all in the “peripheral”, rural 
part of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo. For the satisfac-
tion of “egalitarian claims” there also served the redistribution of ﬁ nancial sources 
via the so-called “tax on non-developed territories”, which was collected especially 
in Slovenia and Croatia. In this model naturally modernisation was not realised, 
above all in the sense of economic and political responsibility of individual in the 
spheres, who were the money-recipients.
In the 1980s the Yugoslav political model fell into deep crisis, which is connected 
with Tito’s death and the absence of a proper successor, economic crisis, emancipa-
tion of northern national units (Slovenia, Croatia) and increase of national spiteful-
ness in Yugoslavia. In the sense of political culture studies we cannot ignore the 
differences between the political cultures of individual societal sectors, which was 
markedly shown during the time of crisis. It has been shown that some sectors were 
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not satisﬁ ed with the depth of the modernisation of political culture and were striv-
ing for future modernisation steps, while others wished to return Yugoslavia to the 
former, “premodern” or “protomodern” development level. Some authors consider 
that, for the stability of the political system, above all the long-term correspondence 
of societal values, norms, models and organisational structure of political system 
are necessary (Bernik 2000: 9). In other words, the institutional form of the political 
system must correspond with the political culture. As we have shown, we cannot 
speak of any dominant political culture in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. After the attempt 
to create a uniﬁ ed Yugoslav nation in the 1980s, (new) independent national politi-
cal cultures appeared, often very different. Satisfying the claims of these cultures 
would be possible only in a very decentralised state; the southern republics and also 
the Belgrade leadership ruled by Milošević do not agree with such decentralisation. 
This civilisation incompetence (Sztompka 1994: 89) is the main cultural political 
starting point for the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
Post-Yugoslav political cultures
The dissimilarity of political culture in the different parts of the former Yugosla-
via was one of the main reasons for disintegration of this state creation. Nowadays 
we could ﬁ nd on the territory of the former Yugoslavia ﬁ ve independent states, 
two protectorates, nine more or less independently developing political systems12 
with their own political cultures and a speciﬁ c position in the space of European 
modern, obmodern and traditional societies. It has been shown that the idea of a 
uniﬁ ed Yugoslav society was unreal and, after the escalation of the conﬂ ict among 
exponents of individual political cultures at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, each 
of the national societies embarked upon an individual, speciﬁ c development, which 
was strongly inﬂ uenced by the political culture of every society.
Searching for stability of political culture in the post-Yugoslav area, we must 
necessarily begin from the premise that this has changed in the last twelve years 
in every post-Yugoslav society. There existed many possibilities of development – 
from the effort to ﬁ nish the modernisation process through limited interventions, 
producing a deformed socialist model of modernisation, to the efforts to return to 
traditional organisation of the society; all these variations are nowadays represented 
in the post-Yugoslavia area. Slovenia is classiﬁ ed as a modern consolidated democ-
racy and Croatia is shown as system with prospects in the sense of modernisation 
and consolidation; while for example Kosovo has changed into a distinctly obmod-
ern society with the superiority of traditional structures on the clan background. 
12 In spite of political declarations of Western statesmen it is necessary to think about at least two 
political systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the same situation is also in the case of Montenegro 
and Kosovo – both are independent societies with own political culture.
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Under the international protectorate, attempts are developing to change the political 
culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and partly in Kosovo. The success 
of these attempts depends substantially on the capability of the societies in question 
to modernise, especially in the political sphere.13 As the ﬁ rst studies on political 
culture in the former Yugoslavia showed, the success of these efforts is very unclear 
(Dimitrijević 2000). Undoubtedly the process will be quite lengthy, stemming – as 
the examples showed – primarily from the most low-ranking levels and not from 
the top (Daskalovski 2000).
After the fall of socialism no one system was oriented directly towards demo-
cratic plural model, but to the different modiﬁ cations of socialism or combina-
tions of the socialist and democratic model. Also nowadays paternalism remains 
the characteristic sign of post-Yugoslav societies (Bernik 1997: 85). Paternalism is 
shown above all in the political and partially also economic dependence of a large 
part of societies on state help and support. The civic sector is developing slowly and 
the main positions still have external actors. An exception is Slovenia, which practi-
cally eschewed wars and embarked upon modernisation changes relatively early.
After the fall of the Milošević regime we may say that the developed western 
countries became an example for all the political systems in the post-Yugoslav area. 
Hopefully, the xenophobic hysteria against western, “materialistic” civilisation has 
disappeared (Draškić 1995): this was something used in political propaganda espe-
cially by Milošević. All systems embarked upon the road of political modernisation 
– economical, political and cultural. To prognosticate the success of this process 
– or its duration – is almost impossible. Tentatively we could perhaps speculate on 
the greater or lesser chances of individual societies. 
At the moment, it seems that the former Yugoslavia is crossed by an invisible 
border, which divides two groups of countries (societies) as the basis of a differ-
ent political culture. The ﬁ rst group is characterised by signiﬁ cant progress in the 
sphere of economic modernisation, modernisation of the political system, orienta-
tion towards political democracy, rule of law and a relatively strong civic society. 
The second group is characterised by non-adherence to the principles of constitu-
tionalism, a tendency to centralise the governance and to oligarchisation of politics 
(Szomolányi 1999: 25; Cabada 2001a). The ﬁ rst group, including Slovenia and 
with reservations also Croatia a Macedonia, is built on an obmodern and modern 
political culture, although even here we could ﬁ nd some traditional components 
which could, in the event of a crisis, lead to the deformation of modernisation. The 
second group includes all other post-Yugoslav systems, where the traditional po-
litical culture still predominates (in possible combination with the post-communist 
13 The protectoral countries are prepared to start economic modernisation with massive ﬁ nancial 
support only after modernisation of political structure and political culture too. 
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one, which is seeking out the pre-communist, mainly nationalistic roots), character-
ised with an unclear position for the individual in political life, little specialisation 
of political institutions, superiority of traditional linkages over the modern political 
linkages etc. In some cases the traditional institutions have pushed back the “mod-
ern” political institutions established in the communist period (Kosovo). 
Conclusion
In the last half-century, political cultures in the post-Yugoslav area were appreci-
ably destabilised in the sense of sharp efforts for change. This destabilisation in 
the form of a modernisation jump retarded modernisation, and reaction to mod-
ernisation manifested itself differently in individual political cultures in Yugoslavia. 
Destabilisation continued also after the disintegration of the uniﬁ ed state and the 
establishment of new states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In Slovenia 
and also after Tudjman’s death in Croatia we could identify this destabilisation with 
modernisation and an endeavour for transition to a democratic model with a clearly 
modern character. In the other post-Yugoslav countries destabilisation went mostly 
in the way of a traditional society with the acceptance of some elements of the 
communist system, which could be characterised as modernisation deformations. 
Further destabilisation in the sense of political modernisation remains a distinct 
possibility, but important changes are still not being realised.  
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